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MEDICAID-HMOs: A DEVICE FOR DELIVERING
HEALTH-CARE SERVICE TO THE POOR?
NANCY A. BURKE*
INTRODUCTION
Judeo Christian ethics call each individual to be a healing
force to others both literally and symbolically.' The rising
cost of medical care, however, diminishes this ability.' Re-
cently, health care costs have risen at an annual rate of 13.2
percent in excess of the general inflation rate.$ These in-
creases have prompted the health care industry and the larg-
est purchaser of medical services, the government, to re-ex-
•amine who has a right to health care, who has an obligation
to finance care and what means should be used to provide
care.
4
Private, charitable and government doctors share in the
ethical obligation to ensure that adequate, quality health care
be made available to all who need it, but cannot afford it.'
Because of the practical limitations of scarce resources, such
care must be provided in a cost-effective manner.
Government has responded to the medical needs of indi-
gents principally through the Medicaid program.6 This pro-
* B.B.A. 1984, University of Notre Dame; J.D. 1987, University of
Notre Dame; Thos. J. White Scholar, 1985-87.
1. Carney, Justice and Health Care: A Theological Review, in JUSTICE
AND HEALTH CARE 37 (E. Shelp ed. 1981). See also Brody, Health Care for the
Haves and Have-Nots: Toward a Just Basis of Distribution in JUSTICE AND
HEALTH CARE 154 (E. Shelp ed. 1981); R. MCCORMICK, HEALTH AND
MEDICINE IN THE CATHOLIC TRADITION (1984).
2. Trends in national health expenditures have shown dramatic in-
creases. National health expenditures in 1965-1983 were $42 billion and
$355 billion, respectively. The projected national health expenditure for
1990 is $660 billion. Arnett, Cowell & Davidoff, Health Spending Trends in
the 1980's: Adjusting to Financial Incentives, 6 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. I
(Spring 1985).[hereinafter Arnett].
3. Id. at 1.
4. DesHarnais, Enrollment in and Disenrollment from Health Mainte-
nance Organizations by Medicaid Recipients, 6 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 39
(Spring 1985).
5. Meeting the health care needs of the poor demands that a variety
of social institutions offer assistance either through separate programs or
through coordinated efforts.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1982).
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gram, a joint federal-state effort, subsidizes the health ex-
penditures for a segment of the nation's poor who meet
income and categorical criteria. The adequacy of Medicaid,
however, is jeopardized by increasing administrative costs
coupled with the rising cost of health care. In an attempt to
contain costs, efforts are underway to integrate health main-
tenance organizations (HMOs) into the Medicaid program
through the use of state-HMO contracts. HMOs provide
comprehensive health care for a prepaid, fixed amount. Be-
cause the combination of these programs presents a poten-
tially cost-effective means of providing quality medical ser-
vices to the poor, this article explores how Medicaid might be
restructured to promote the development of Medicaid-
HMOs.
I. CURRENT RESPONSES TO THE HEALTH CARE NEEDS OF THE
POOR
A. Medicaid
Medicaid was enacted in 1965 pursuant to title XIX of
the Social Security Act.' It is a joint federal-state welfare pro-
gram that provides public assistance for the health care ex-
penditures of the poor who both apply and meet income and
categorical criteria.8 Medicaid seeks to ensure the poor
"mainstream" medical assistance by eliminating the financial
restraints that prevent the poor from having access to quality
health care.9
Medicaid attempts to achieve quality service for lower in-
come individuals through freedom of choice and the reim-
bursement of costs. Eligible Medicaid recipients are free to
choose medical services from any provider, including an insti-
tution, individual practitioner or prepaid plan which satisfies
state standards.' 0 The federal government, through the
state's Medicaid agency, reimburses the provider of ser-
7. Distinguish Medicare, enacted in conjunction with Medicaid in
1965. Medicare is an insurance program for the elderly, who have contrib-
uted to the fund. Medicaid is a welfare program. With the enactment of
both Medicare and Medicaid, the government became the nation's largest,
single purchaser of health care in the country.
8. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Pub. No. (PHS) 81-
50168, Medicaid Beneficiaries in Health Maintenance Organizations, 1 (1980)
[hereinafter Medicaid Beneficiaries].
9. Id.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(23) (1982).
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vices."i Despite admirable objectives, both the access to and
quality and administration of the Medicaid program have not
always met expectations."2
Medicaid patients have limited access to care, in part, be-
cause few primary physicians locate in areas with high con-
centration of low income families. 3 Even those that do locate
in these areas are reluctant to serve Medicaid recipients be-
cause of low Medicaid reimbursement rates, as well as an ad-
ministration bureaucracy which delays reimbursement.
Transportation to providers outside the low income areas is
generally unavailable. 4 Because access to care in low income
areas is limited, many Medicaid recipients seek other, usually
more expensive, sources of primary health care in hospital
outpatient rooms, including emergency rooms. 5 This also
suggests that Medicaid recipients receive medical assistance
only for their immediate health needs, rather than mainte-
nance or preventive care. This problem of inaccessibility has
prompted some states to question the wisdom of freedom of
choice.' 6 For example, it is sometimes argued by state Medi-
caid agencies that they could make more efficient use of the
program's limited dollars by channeling Medicaid recipients
to accessible, lower cost facilities, where the quality of care
administered could be monitored.' 7
The quality of care available to the Medicaid recipient
may also be substandard. Some have found that the Medicaid
provider market has been dominated by less qualified physi-
cians, many of whom are non-board certified graduates of
foreign medical schools.' 8 "Medicaid doctors" may also take
11. Id. at § 1396(a)(13) (1982).
12. E. NEUSCHLER AND K. SQUARRELL, PREPAID AND MANAGED CARE
UNDER MEDICAID: OVERVIEW OF CURRENT INITIATIVES 1 (1985) [hereinafter
Neuschler].
13. Medicaid Beneficiaries, supra note 8, at 7.
14. Id. See also infra note 50 and accompanying text.
15. Neuschler, supra note 12, at 1.
16. These states do not seek to limit the options of the poor for ad-
ministrative simplicity, but instead hope to assure the Medicaid recipient
has access to providers that will give prompt, well-coordinated care when
needed. Id. at 14.
17. Medicaid Freedom of Choice Waiver Activities: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 2 Sess. (March
30, 1984). See also, STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 98th Cong., 2
Sess., NEW APPROACHES TO PROVIDING HEALTH CARE TO THE POOR: MEDI-
CAID FREEDOM OF CHOICE WAIVER ACTIVITIES (Comm. Print 1984).
18. Mitchell & Cromwell, Medicaid Mills: Fact or Fiction?, 2 HEALTH
CARE FIN. REV. 37, 43 (Summer 1980).
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on high case loads and provide minimum services. Such activ-
ities have led to the creation of "Medicaid Mills," where pa-
tients wait hours to receive any type of care. 9 This system
fails to attend to either the health needs or dignity of the
patient. Medicaid is also plagued by lax claim processing and
an insufficient monitoring system to protect against fraud by
Medicaid recipients and health care providers. A federal
study determined that participating doctors frequently boost
fees and over-serve Medicaid recipients."0
Despite these shortcomings, Medicaid continues to pro-
vide basic medical service to the nation's poor. Medicaid's op-
erational problems coupled with the rising cost of health
care, however, jeopardize the continued existence of any type
of government subsidized health program. One possible
means for containing health care costs has been the develop-
ment of health maintenance organizations. Before exploring
the use of HMOs for Medicaid recipients, they are briefly
described.
B. HMOs
The concept of the prepaid health care system has been
heralded as the solution to contain medical costs since the
1920s.11 Only within the past eighteen years, however, have
prepaid health systems come to the forefront in the form of
health maintenance organizations."2 Health maintenance or-
ganizations provide comprehensive health care services to an
enrolled population for a fixed sum of money, paid in ad-
vance of the rendering of medical services. 3 HMOs adminis-
ter services through a "package of benefits" that is available
19. Id. at 43-44.
20. Medicaid Beneficiaries, supra note 8, at 2.
21. Spitz, When a Solution Is Not a Solution: Medicaid and Health Main-
tenance Organizations, 3 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 497, 500 (1979).
22. In 1971 there were thirty-one HMOs in existence in the country.
In 1982 there were over 250 HMOs and a 1990 projection of 450 opera-
tional HMO plans. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PUB. No. H-
79, HOSPITALS AND HMOs: AN OVERVIEW OF HOSPITAL SPONSORSHIP OF
HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS 2 (1982).
23. HMOs are essentially corporate entities which provide a system
of health care through one of four organizational formalities: (1) Staff
models; (2) Group models; (3) Individual practice associations (IPAs); and
(4) Network models. For a detailed discussion of the structure and opera-
tion of each of these models, see DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SER-
VICES, HMO: Technical Assistance Monograph Guide for Fee-for-Service Medical
Groups on Affiliation with HMOs (1982).
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24 hours a day.2" Notably, the package of benefits may ex-
empt extraordinary services, such as cancer treatments, or
may require the enrollee to pay an additional price for ser-
vices outside the package.25
HMOs have several advantages which make the concept
particularly attractive to the health care industry and the
Medicaid program." The prepayment of a fixed sum each
month encourages health providers to serve patients in the
most cost-efficient manner, since profit is not dependent on
the volume or type of services rendered.27 The centralized
system is also more administratively effective than a reim-
bursement process. Records need not be duplicated; referral
services are readily available; and paper work, such as billing,
decreases.' Consumers have greater access to a wide range
of medical assistance within one structure. 29 Particularly im-
portant to Medicaid, budgeting medical expenditures is more
exact with the use of a prospective payment system.30
Despite their many advantages, HMOs also have several
inherent disadvantages, which limit their effectiveness in the
Medicaid program.3 1 Enrollees must use only the HMO's ser-
vices. 2 A fixed allocation of facilities and personnel minimize
the locations to which enrollees have access." Thus, enrollees
may have to relinquish established doctor-patient relation-
ships in order to partake in the more cost-effective HMO sys-
tem. 4 Even once enrolled in an HMO, the patient rarely has
one particular physician.
Prepayment may also be an incentive to cut back on the
amount and quality of care provided, so the patient is under-
served. 5 Benefit packages may exclude many health services,
particularly for catastrophic illnesses, which require lengthy
24. Id. at 3.
25. Id.
26. Medicaid Beneficiaries, supra note 8, at 4-6.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 5.
29. Id.
30. The use of a reimbursement payment system instead of a pro-
spective payment system has resulted in Medicaid being considered an "un-
controllable" program whose expenditures are not subject to the Congres-
sional appropriation process. Id. at 2.
31. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Monograph Guide for Fee-
for-Service Medical Groups, supra note 23, at 4-7.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. See also DesHarnais, supra note 4, at 41.
35. See DesHarnais, supra note 4, at 41.
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and expensive treatments.3 6 Finally, the only control mecha-
nism monitoring the quality of HMO services on a continu-
ous basis may be the state's Medicaid agency's Medical Care
Advisory Committee (MCAC). Yet, such advisory committees
seem ill-suited to this task." These disadvantages aside, the
HMO is increasingly suggested as a vehicle for delivery of
medical services to Medicaid recipients.
C. Medicaid-HMOs: The Current Framework
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
through the offices of Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA), which oversees Medicaid, and the Office of Health
Maintenance Organizations, which oversees HMOs, regulates
the relationship between Medicaid and HMOs. 8 Both offices
act pursuant to title XIX of the Social Security Act. 9
Title XIX authorizes state Medicaid agencies to enter
into contracts with HMOs."' Medicaid recipients have the op-
portunity to enroll in an HMO in contractual privity with the
state. The state pays the HMO a fixed amount based on the
number of Medicaid recipients enrolled and the average cost
of health care.41 From 1977 to 1981 states were allowed to
36. See supra note 23.
37. See the discussion infra accompanying footnotes 51-53. These
committees are discussed at 42 C.F.R. 431.12(a) (1986); see generally, David-
son, Harold & Simon, The Medical Care Advisory Committee for State Medicaid
Programs: Current Status and Trends, 5 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 89 (Spring
1984) [hereinafter Davidson].
38. Both offices act pursuant to federal statutes: Title XIX of the So-
cial Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1982) and The Health Maintenance
Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1982).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1982).
40. See 42 C.F.R. § 434.20 (1986) for guidelines on State Medicaid
Agency Contracts with HMOs. See also Office of Health Maintenance Orga-
nizations of the Department of Health and Human Services Model HMO-
State Medicaid Agency Contract (May 1984).
41. Contracts can be either risk or nonrisk. Both define an upper
limit on the amount of payment the state Medicaid agency will be required
to forward. With risk contracts the HMO bears the risk of changing medi-
cal costs since the state agency never pays more than the agreed prepay-
ment. Nonrisk contracts, however, may require the state Medicaid agency
at the end of the contract period to make limited retroactive payments for
the actual costs of services rendered in excess of prepaid amount, subject to
an upper limitation. Most HMO-Medicaid contracts are at-risk contracts.
Still, since both are bound by an upper limit, which is always less than the
comparable fee-for-service costs, practically risk and nonrisk contracts have
the cost-effectiveness advantage. Still, savings with the risk contracts may
be more than savings with comparable nonrisk contracts. See 42 C.F.R.
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enroll Medicaid recipients only in federally qualified
HMOs,"2 that did not have more than 50 percent Medicare
and Medicaid enrollment. In 1981, however, the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) amended title XIX of the
Social Security Act. Since 1981, the state may establish its
own qualification standards for HMOs serving Medicaid pa-
tients, and HMOs contracting with Medicaid may have up to
75 percent Medicare and Medicaid enrollment.4" Today most
Medicaid recipients may choose to enroll in an HMO in priv-
ity with the state, remain with the traditional fee-for-service
provider reimbursement system, or enroll in an alternative
state prepaid health plan.44
Although states have flexibility in contracting with
health maintenance organizations, HHS suggests a model
contract which is used by most Medicaid agencies with some
modification. Use of the model contract ensures compliance
with federal regulation. For example, the model contract re-
quires that the HMO offer particular minimum services and
establish an in-house procedure for hearing complaints."'
While federal and state regulations offer the general frame-
work for the Medicaid-HMO program, success has been mod-
erate. 46 The remainder of this comment explores changes in
the structure of both Medicaid and HMOs which might im-
prove the performance of this device.
II. MEDICAID-HMOs: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
A. Accessibility
For HMOs to be accessible to Medicaid recipients, the
HMOs must be located in or near low income neighbor-
hoods. Such locations, however, discourage non-Medicaid re-
cipients from enrolling in the HMO.' Because HMOs earn a
profit by enrolling low risk consumers, and because non-
§ 434.20 (1986); 42 C.F.R. §§ 447.361-.362 (1986).
42. 42 C.F.R. § 434.20 (1986). A federally-qualified HMO is one that
satisfies the requirements of The Health Maintenance Organization Act of
1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e (1982). The Act offers qualified HMOs grants,
contracts and loan guarantees to be used for the formation and operation
of HMOs. Id. at §§ 300e-3, 300e-4.
43. Neuschler, supra note 12, at 3.
44. Id.
45. See supra note 40. See also 42 C.F.R. § 434.32 (1986).
46. See generally DesHarnais, supra note 4; Medicaid Beneficiaries,
supra note 9.
47. Spitz, supra note 21, at 510.
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Medicaid recipients traditionally are generally a lower health
care risk than Medicaid recipients,"8 HMOs need to locate
where they can attract both the non-Medicaid and Medicaid
consumer. Despite federal provisions offering additional
monetary subsidies for HMOs locating in low income areas,
HMOs continue to locate in middle class areas.49
To foster accessibility of HMOs to Medicaid recipients,
two plans should be considered. First, federal assistance
should be geared to subsidize the development of HMOs in
"middle ground areas" where the HMO could draw both
from a middle and upper income and Medicaid population.
Second, if such a middle ground area is nonexistent and
HMOs are located outside areas of ready access to Medicaid
recipients, either the HMO or local Medicaid agency could
provide transportation to transport Medicaid recipients from
their residences to the HMO. 50
B. Quality Controls
Not only must HMOs be accessible to Medicaid recipi-
ents, but the care provided must be quality care, sufficient to
meet the recipient's needs. Aside from the initial state or fed-
eral quality standards HMOs must meet to be able to contract
with state Medicaid agencies, no effective on-going monitor-
ing systems or inherent incentives exist to ensure that Medi-
caid recipients receive quality care adequate for their needs.
Federal law requires each state Medicaid agency to estab-
lish a Medical Care Advisory Committee to present an "op-
portunity for participation in policy development." '51 Medical
providers, consumers and government representatives com-
pose the MCAC. The Committee's purpose is to examine any
deficiencies in the delivery of medical assistance to Medicaid
recipients and to propose changes to best meet the demands
48. See generally DesHarnais, supra note 4, at 48. Medicaid recipients
are documented to be higher-risk users, requiring more frequent health
care. Id.
49. The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300e-2(e), 300e-3(f) (1982). The Act also gives special consideration to
grant and loan applications for HMOs which will serve medically under-
served populations. Id. at §§ 300e-2(c), 300e-3(d), 300e-4(f).
50. This proposal had been suggested by former HHS Secretary
Margaret Heckler. The plan, however, has never been tested. For other
proposals offered by Heckler, see Demkovich, Margaret Heckler Shows Fight-
ing Style, Proving She Came to Stay at HHS, 16 NAT'L J. (1984).
51. 42 C.F.R. § 431.12(e) (1986). See also Davidson, supra note 37, at
96.
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of the recipients. In fact, the MCAC is often superficial by
nature. When the Committee does meet, much of the Com-
mittee's discussion focuses on MCAC's "own role and func-
tion." 52 Only 16 percent of all state MCACs have established
procedures to investigate the workings of the state Medicaid
program. 3 Despite these shortcomings, the MCAC might be
reformulated to monitor more closely the quality of care pro-
vided Medicaid recipients and to investigate complaints of
both the HMO and Medicaid recipient. For example, federal
law might require that states outline the scope of the MCAC
as an investigative and monitoring body, detail procedures
for investigation of Medicaid-HMO problems, require regu-
lar meetings, and provide an informal mechanism by which
both HMOs and Medicaid recipients could present com-
plaints to the Committee.
Quality of care is also affected by the method of compen-
sation provided to medical personnel. Some doctors receive
salaries, others receive a fixed percentage, depending on the
number of enrollees served. If doctors are paid on a salary
basis, they have less incentive to "rush through" patients in
order to increase the number attended, thereby increasing
their own income. Thus, states should be encouraged to con-
tract with HMOs employing salaried doctors, to avoid sacri-
ficing the quality of care administered in favor of the quan-
tity of patients assisted.
C. Medicaid Recipient Enrollment
Medicaid recipients will need some encouragement to
participate in HMOs simply by reason of lack of familiarity
with the HMO structure. This lack of knowledge is partly at-
tributable to the statutorily-required freedom of choice al-
luded to earlier." In this regard, a state cannot direct Medi-
caid recipients to more cost-effective providers"5 or even
provide recipients with information regarding the benefits of
an HMO. Any communication regarding the quality of prov-
iders has been construed as influencing the recipient's selec-
tion of provider in violation of freedom of choice.56
52. Davidson, supra note 37, at 96.
53. Id.
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395, 1395a (1982).
55. Staff of Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 2 Sess., New Ap-
proaches to Providing Health Care to the Poor: Medicaid Freedom of Choice
Waiver Activities, 3 (Comm. Print, 1984).
56. See id. at 5, 7.
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Some states have recently been granted a waiver from
the freedom of choice provision pursuant to section 1915(b)
of the Social Security Act.57 In these cases, states have been
allowed to restrict recipients receiving health care services
(other than emergency care) to a given number of efficient
and cost-effective providers.58 States are also permitted to dis-
seminate information detailing the advantages and disadvan-
tages of each of these providers. Unfortunately, the applica-
tion for and the granting of waivers can be a lengthy and
burdensome process.59 Consideration should be given to
amending the freedom of choice provision to allow all states
the ability to limit the number of providers available to Medi-
caid recipients.
D. HMO Incentives
HMOs also need incentives to enter into contracts with
the state Medicaid agency. Many HMOs have been reluctant
to enter into state contracts because Medicaid recipients are
high risk medical consumers, requiring more health care
than the average consumer.6" To offset the disparity between
the average consumer and the Medicaid consumer, fixed pay-
ments to the HMO should not be based on the cost of care
for the average consumer, but on the cost of care for the av-
erage Medicaid recipient in that area. This allows for a more
realistic assessment between the price paid and the cost of
services rendered to the recipient.
HMOs are also reluctant to enter into state contracts be-
cause of the high disenrollment of Medicaid recipients.61
Medicaid recipients may terminate enrollment in an HMO at
any time.62 Recipients often enroll in an HMO for one month
and disenroll the next.6" In such cases, the HMO cannot ade-
quately budget for needed services nor anticipated costs. To
ensure greater consistency in budgeting and to encourage
HMOs to enroll Medicaid recipients, as well as to give the
recipient an opportunity to fairly evaluate the HMO, the
state should require the recipient to be "locked in" for a
minimum of six months.
57. Id. at 1.
58. Id. at 6-7.
59. Id. at 6.
60. See generally DesHarnais, supra note 4, at 40.
61. See id. at 48.
62. 42 C.F.R. § 434.27(b)(1) (1986).
63. See generally DesHarnais, supra note 4, at 48.
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CONCLUSION
As the present Medicaid program struggles with the ris-
ing costs of health care, it is worth considering new systems
of health care delivery to the nation's poor. HMOs provide a
potentially cost-efficient way to offer quality care. Several
changes in Medicaid's existing statutory and regulatory struc-
ture have been presented. These somewhat tentative sugges-
tions may help ensure the provision of adequate, quality care
to Medicaid recipients at an affordable cost.

